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portada Trust and Credit in Organizations and Institutions: As Viewed from the Evolution of Cooperation (en Inglés)
Formato
Libro Físico
Autor
Editorial
Idioma
Inglés
N° páginas
318
Encuadernación
Tapa Blanda
Dimensiones
23.4x15.6x1.8 cm
Peso
0.49 kg.
ISBN13
9789811949814
Categorías

Trust and Credit in Organizations and Institutions: As Viewed from the Evolution of Cooperation (en Inglés)

Mayuko Nakamaru (Autor) · Springer · Tapa Blanda

Trust and Credit in Organizations and Institutions: As Viewed from the Evolution of Cooperation (en Inglés) - Nakamaru, Mayuko

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Reseña del libro "Trust and Credit in Organizations and Institutions: As Viewed from the Evolution of Cooperation (en Inglés)"

This book shows that evolutionary game theory can unravel how mutual cooperation, trust, and credit in a group emerge in organizations and institutions. Some organizations and institutions, such as insurance unions, credit unions, and banks, originated from very simple mutual-aid groups. Members in these early-stage mutual-aid groups help each other, making rules to promote cooperation, and suppressing free riders. Then, they come to "trust" not only each other but also the group they belong to, itself. The division of labor occurs when the society comes to have diversity and complexity in a larger group, and the division of labor also requires mutual cooperation and trust among different social roles. In a larger group, people cannot directly interact with each other, and the reputation of unknown people helps other decide who is a trustworthy person. However, if gossip spreads untruths about a reputation, trust and cooperation are destroyed.Therefore, how to suppress untrue gossip is also important for trust and cooperation in a larger group. If trustworthiness and credibility can be established, these groups are successfully sustainable. Some develop and evolve and then mature into larger organizations and institutions. Finally, these organizations and institutions become what they are now. Therefore, not only cooperation but also trust and credit are keys to understanding these organizations and institutions.The evolution of cooperation, a topic of research in evolutionary ecology and evolutionary game theory, can be applied to understanding how to make institutions and organizations sustainable, trustworthy, and credible. It provides us with the idea that evolutionary game theory is a good mathematical tool to analyze trust and credit. This kind of research can be applied to current hot topics such as microfinance and the sustainable use of ecosystems.

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