Name: The Efficacy of Judicial Review. The Rule of Law and the Promise of Independent Courts
Price: 213994.00 ARS
Availability: InStock
Author: Amanda Driscoll;Michael J. Nelson;Jay N. Krehbiel
ISBN: 9781009388924

portada The Efficacy of Judicial Review. The Rule of Law and the Promise of Independent Courts

The Efficacy of Judicial Review. The Rule of Law and the Promise of Independent Courts

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Autor

Amanda Driscoll;Michael J. Nelson;Jay N. Krehbiel

Colección

Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy

Año

2025

N° páginas

308

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Dimensiones

23.50 x 16.20 x 2.30 cm

ISBN13

9781009388924

The Efficacy of Judicial Review. The Rule of Law and the Promise of Independent Courts

Amanda Driscoll;Michael J. Nelson;Jay N. Krehbiel (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Dura

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Reseña del libro "The Efficacy of Judicial Review. The Rule of Law and the Promise of Independent Courts"

Constitutional courts are democracy's guardians, yet their ability to withstand challenges to their authority is tenuous. Using surveys fielded in the US, Germany, Poland, and Hungary, this book demonstrates that a court's efficacy depends crucially on both its independence and citizens' support for the rule of law.

Over the past century, countries around the globe have empowered constitutional courts to safeguard the rule of law. But when can courts effectively perform this vital task? Drawing upon a series of survey experiments fielded in the United States, Germany, Hungary, and Poland, this book demonstrates that judicial independence is critical for judicial efficacy, showing that independent courts are uniquely capable of empowering citizens to punish executives who flout the rule of law, while also demonstrating that weak courts are unable to generate public support for upholding the rule of law. This important work concludes that, while judicial efficacy is neither universal nor automatic, courts-so long as they are viewed by the public as independent-can provide an effective check on executives and promote the rule of law.