Name: Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective (en Inglés)
Price: 65883.00 ARS
Availability: InStock
Author: Lynne Rudder Baker
ISBN: 9780199914746

portada Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Oup Usa

Autor

Lynne Rudder Baker

Año

2013

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

272

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

ISBN

0199914745

ISBN13

9780199914746

N° edición

Categorías

Tradiciones y escuelas de pensamiento

Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective (en Inglés)

Lynne Rudder Baker (Autor) · Oup Usa · Tapa Blanda

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Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

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Reseña del libro "Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective (en Inglés)"

Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a nonCartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal. After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality.